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Abstract
This paper sets forth that sinking funds foster corporate governance,
either when they intend to build up the principal of bonds and financial
hybrids to be repaid at maturity date, or to plan ahead the purchase of
fixed assets in the future. To lay foundations, firstly we expand on the
logic  of  sinking  funds,  by  reviewing  the  standard  model  of  capital
formation. Proven drawbacks of this model, however, pave the way for
our  proposal  of  undertaking  a  portfolio  management  approach  for
which  we  furnish  an  iterative  resetting  program  that  deals  with
unavoidable  imbalances  of  the  underlying  portfolio.  Secondly,  we
develop  the  pragmatics  of  sinking  funds,  which  focus  on  the  choice
problem attached to sinking funds and the fiduciary role expected from
an appointed portfolio manager. Lastly, we move on to a protocol with
suitable  covenants  to  be  embedded  in  a  bond  placement,  so  as  to
enhance  the  governance  of  those  organizations  that  dare  to  avail
themselves of sinking funds.
JEL : G38, G30, G32
Key words: sinking fund, corporate governance, bonds placement, financial
hybrids, fixed assets, capital formation, portfolio management.
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INTRODUCTION
For  almost  a  century,  scholars  have  given  scant  regard  to  sinking
funds. If we seek for references in JSTOR, for instance, we will find
that  they  were  surprisingly  sparse  in  the  last  hundred  years,  the
fewest  related  to  fixed  assets  provisions,  the  remaining  addressing
either bonds or preferred stock redemptions.
Among the former lot, we come upon an extremely noticeable essay
written  by  Alfred  Chandler,  way  back  in  1913,  which  delved  into
diverse amortization mechanisms. Representatives of the latter lot are
two  contributions  that  match  the  subject  matter  of  our  present
research.  Firstly,  an  old  but  still  readable  review  of  British  and
American policies of funding and retrieving government debt through
sinking funds along the XVIII and XIX centuries (Edward Ross, 1892).
Secondly, an article by Lawrence Wilsey (1947), dealing with the use
of sinking funds in Preferred Stock issues in the United States
1.
Up to our knowledge, however, this is the first paper that extensively
underscores  the  close  link  between  sinking  funds  and  corporate
governance. The roadmap will be the following:
In section 1, we lay bare the logic of sinking funds, by expanding on
the  underlying  mathematics  of  the  standard  model  for  capital
formation  processes  and  stressing  some  of  its  downsides.  Next,  we
argue that a more sensible approach to sinking funds naturally stems
from portfolio building. Lastly, we develop a very simple algorithm that
deals with the resetting of the portfolio’s valuation.
It  is  for  section  2  to  put  forward  the  pragmatics  of  a  sinking  fund
grounded  on  two  distinctive  issues.  On  the  one  hand,  the  choice
problem of a financial vehicle  that  could  turn  out  a  targeted  capital
stock in the future. On the other, we discuss the role of a fiduciary
agent in managing the sinking fund.
In section 3, we are going to show how sinking funds play a distinctive
part on the governance and practices of any organization in the private
sector. Afterwards, it will be set down a protocol for sinking funds in
the case of bonds’ placements.
                                                
1 We may also refer here to our own contribution (Apreda, 2004) devoted to one- and
two-tiered convertible preferred stock.4
Last of all, three appendices furnish with mathematical foundations to
sections 1 and 2.
1.  THE LOGIC OF SINKING FUNDS
What are the inner structure, overall purposes, and the computational
method that sinking funds bid for? In other words, what is the logic
behind these financial vehicles? To start working with these topics, we
need to bring forward a definition functional to this paper.
Definition 1 Sinking Funds
By Sinking Fund we understand a process of capital formation in the
future, adding up to the amount
FV (0; N)
that will evolve through a given planning horizon,
H = [0; N]
divided in N periods of equal size
[k; k + 1]      ;   k  = 0, 1, 2, …… , N – 1
by means of the iterative allocation, at the beginning of each period
along H, of a well defined pattern of cash flows
CF ( k )     ;    k  =  0, 1, 2, …. , N – 1
which will earn expected returns
R(k; k + 1)
period after period, till maturity at date N.
To place this definition into perspective, some qualifications must be
borne in mind.
Firstly, there is no denying the fact that alternative statements
of  meaning  are  available:  for  instance,  periods  may  have
unequal length, or cash flows may be disbursed at the end of
each period instead of the beginning.5
Secondly, albeit the mainstream notion of sinking funds regards
them as financial tools to retire debt year after year
2, a different
view  will  be  stressed  in  this  paper.  Actually,  we  are  going  to
focus on sinking funds pertaining capital formation processes not
only linked with debt, but also with financial hybrids
3 or capital
assets. Furthermore, and in all cases, the kind of sinking fund we
are interested in will evolve till maturity date without any sort of
progressive redemption.
Lastly, as we will develop in sections 2 and 3, our definition will
allow for an in-built feature consisting in the fact that the sinking
fund is managed by an externally fiduciary agent, and not from
within the company.
In  current  usage,  two  criteria  have  prevailed  when  assessing  which
cash flows would be the most operational for the funding of a sinking
fund
4:
￿ either  they  are  framed  upon  the  company’s  earnings  during  the
preceding year, after accounting for taxes, preferr ed and ordinary
dividends;
￿ or  they  are  measured  up  after  taxes,  but  before  pre ferred  and
ordinary dividends, which liken them to a fixed cha rge, the sort of
contractual payments we usually find in debt contra cts.
Although not denying the advantages of the first cr iterion, we rather
advocate  for  the  second  one,  since  it  prioritizes  a   tighter  budget
constraint and, moreover, better governance.
It must be noticed that the sinking fund of Definit ion 1 stands apart
from  the  prevailing  meaning  of  a  contingency  fund .  The  latter
consists in an amount of money (or string of cash flows, eventually)
that a company sets aside to pay for a possible expense or loss in the
future. The contingency attribute points to the fact that money outlays
                                                
2  By  means  of  contractual  patterns  of  anticipated  redemption  mechanisms,  from
lottery devices to  call-provision  constraints  embedded  as  covenants  in  bank  loans
and bond contracts.
3 A corporate bond, or preferred stock with an attached warrant, for instance. In the
case  of  convertible  bonds  or  preferred  stock,  the  implicit  option  could  impair  the
sinking fund and increase the cost of the vehicle. More on this in footnote 5.
4 In his insightful paper on amortization Chandler (1913) stressed that, in order to
extinguish  debt  through  sinking  funds,  it  should  be  used  the  revenue  above  the
expenses.6
would be solely triggered off on the grounds of a well-defined event
expected in the future. In contradistinction, the sinking fund can be
seen  as  a  purposeful  design  of  cash  flows  to  meet  a  forward
commitment whose monetary value does not depend on random states
of the world.
To round off this section, a question might be arisen as to whether we
could set up a contingency fund by means of a sinking fund. We can
do  it,  by  all  means,  because  the  former  is  a  future  capital  that  we
would need if the defining contingency took place, while the latter is a
suitable  mechanism  by  which  the  required  capital  accrues  as  time
passes by. On the other hand, if the contingency did not happen, then
the  sinking  fund  would  be  employed  in  alternative  allocations  at
maturity date
5.
1.1  THE UNDERLYING MATHEMATICS
How do we establish a future amount of money by setting aside cash
flows that will earn returns over certain span of time? The  simplest
model of sinking fund that has been used for centuries springs from
the following assumptions:
￿ cash flows are constant, that is to say
CF ( k )  =  C        ;           k = 0, 1, 2, ………  , N – 1
￿ period  after  period,  cash  flows  earn  a  fixed  rate  o f  return  that
amounts to a suitable rate of interest in the money  market:
R(k; k + 1)  =  I
With such constraints, it can easily be proved
6 that the future capital
will add up to
(1)
FV(0; N)   =  [ C / I ]  .  [ ( 1 + I )
N – 1 ] . [ 1 + I ]
                                                
5 By the way, this could be a rationale for solving the problem posed by financial
convertibles,  as  we  have  remarked  in  footnote  3.  In  this  particular  example,  and
when transaction costs are not an obstacle, a contingency fund may be designed by
means  of  a  sinking  fund.  If  conversion  were  brought  into  completion  before  the
maturity of the sinking fund, at the latter date an alternative allocation of the capital
could be found eventually. However, and all along this paper, we deal with financials
without convertibility properties.
6 The reader is referred to Appendix 1 for a direct proof of (1), and to Appendix 2 for
a general proof using the Principle of Mathematical Induction.7
Whereas this straightforward model has been widely taught and drilled
in university courses, so becoming a  truly  useful  device  that  makes
students  conversant  with  capital  formation  processes,  it  runs  into
trouble any time we attempt to implement it in real settings. It’s worth
taking this matter further.
If investors
7 or companies intended to follow this model outright, they
should commit C dollars at the beginning of each period. Furthermore,
returns to be expected from cash flows would be explained by the rate
of  interest  I  that  this  model  assumes  to  be  constant,  a  rather
implausible target to achieve in real life
8.
Among  workable  ways  to  tie  up  a  contractual  constant  rate,  two  of
them have currently been employed:
a) The company or investor enters into a long-term agr eement with
some financial institution that could grant the cap ital formation
in accordance with the program
9 conveyed by relationship (1). It
goes  without  saying  that  in  such  environment  the  financial
institution  should  hedge  the  rate-of-interest  risk  on  its  own,
usually by means of financial derivatives. This kind of transaction
conventionally takes place in the money market and, most of the
time is carried out by means of chartered banks.
b) Otherwise, the company or investor might get access  to a string
of forward contracts on rates of interest. Neverthe less, a direct
bargain  seems  unlikely  without  a  broker  o  dealer  th at  could
agree to lock up the same rate of interest along th e intended
horizon, by means of a combo of derivatives, like a  swap of rates
of  interest,  to  assist  in  the  development  of  capita l  formation.
This transaction makes its way through the derivati ves market
with the assistance of certified brokers or dealers .
For all practical purposes, both procedures stop sh ort of being helpful.
Among  the  main  reasons  for  this  to  happen  we  should   highlight
                                                
7  For  the  sake  of  example,  individuals  or  household  investing  in  real  estate  or
retirement  plans.  Next,  we  should  include  institutional  investors,  like  insurance
companies  or pension funds,  for  which  the  capital  formation  processes  are  of  the
essence, to say the least.
8 In point of fact, as long as interest rates stayed smooth, banks would be ready to
lend by charging fixed rates, or bond issuers would be offering fixed-rate coupons.
But  since  the  70s  the  staging  has  undergone  deep  changes,  and  the  temporal
structure of rates of return turned out to be more volatile than ever before.
9 More often than not we know in advance which is FV(0; N), while N and I are
currently inputs for the program. Hence, we derive the value of C from (1) outright.8
financial costs faced by companies, and the understandable reluctance
on  the  part  of  banks  and  brokers  to  commit  themselves  with  such
transactions instead of undertaking the role of portfolio managers on
their own.
Thereupon, we must weigh up the pros and cons of portfolio building
as a more tenable methodology.
1.2  PORTFOLIO BUILDING
This approach rests upon the following premises:
a) at the beginning of each period and all along the c hosen horizon
H = [0; N] , the company earmarks cash flows
CF ( k )      ;     k  =  0, 1, 2, …. , N – 1
to be allocated to the purchase of financial assets ;
b) those assets are put together into a portfolio to p rovide a sound
return so that, at maturity date  N, a terminal value equal to
FV (0; N)
might be successfully established;
c) The management of such a portfolio may be handed ov er to the
company’s treasurer or, still better, committed to  the expertise
of  an  appointed  fiduciary  agent.  In  this  paper,  we  definitely
embrace the latter alternative.
For the sake of illustration, we are going to bring  forward two decision-
making procedures that actually meet the former con straints. The first
one  takes  advantage  of  zero-coupon  bonds,  whereas  t he  second
profits from mainstream tools in the practice of po rtfolio management.
i) The case for zero-coupon bonds
At the beginning of each period, the company, or the fiduciary agent,
purchases a zero-coupon bond that costs
PVB(k; N)       ;   k = 0, 1, 2, …… , N – 19
which will deliver, at maturity date N, a monetary amount equal to
B(k; N)
 10.
To put the whole chain of transactions into a sensible framework of
analysis, two requirements come in handy:
￿ a boundary condition that must hold at maturity dat e:
(2)
FV (0; N)   =
=     B(0; N)  +  B(1; N)  +  B(2; N)  +   ….  +  B(N-1; N)
that  is  to  say,  zero-coupon  bonds  end  up  delivering  the  targeted
amount of money at maturity;
￿ a rule for buying zero-coupon bonds for (2) to hold eventually;
for instance by choosing
B(k; N)  =  FV(0; N) / N
It follows from this procedure that we are not longer constrained to
cope  with  constant  cash  flows  and  fixed  rates.  Period  after  period,
market returns and prices will tell the company, or the fiduciary, how
much money ought to be disbursed for the purchasing of each zero-
coupon.
But  a  model  worked  out  from  zero-coupon  bonds  gives  rise  to
foreseeable troubles, among which the following are frequent:
- they are not available in developing markets to the same extent
they are in New York or London markets; even in global markets, to
overcome this drawback by means of Strips from standing Treasury
Bills and Bonds is easier said than done;
- sometimes, the buying schedule entails a mismatch between the
maturity  date  of  Strips  with  the  maturity  claimed  by  the  capital
formation process
11;
                                                
10  In  the  latter  scenario,  the  company  sends  an  amount  of  money,  PVB(k;  N)
dollars, to the fiduciary who manages the sinking fund portfolio.
11  Albeit  such  would  be  a  minor  issue  eventually,  provided  we  could  reframe  our
horizon to match the schedule of available zero-coupons.10
 - whenever the temporal structure of financial returns followed a
persistently  declining  pattern,  to  get  zero-coupons  would  become
expensive.
Briefly stated, this technique seems appealing enough, but only when
the market offers companies and investors with a wide variety of zero-
coupons.  Unless  such  supply  could  be  warranted,  another  sort  of
engineering would be worth being tried.
ii) Mainstream portfolio management
In this environment we assume that a qualified portfolio manager, who
acts as a fiduciary agent
12, will demand the company to deliver, at the
beginning of each period, an amount of cash flows equal to
CF ( k )     ; k  =  0, 1, 2, …. , N-1
The money will be applied to the purchase of financial assets with the
ultimate goal of building up a portfolio P to be held till maturity at date
N,  earning  returns  period  after  period  to  raise  a  future  capital
equivalent to FV(0; N) dollars in the end.
Whereas  such  approach  is  wide-ranging  in  scope  and  gathers  the
blessings of practitioners, implementation brings up four problems to
be solved:
a) Who is to manage the portfolio and up to what costs ?
b) By which means the investors’ rights are kept safe?
c) How to determine the most fitting pattern of cash f lows for the
capital formation process?
d) How to deal with the portfolio’s underperformance?
13
At  this  juncture,  we  turn  to  question  c).  The  alter native  I  am
advocating here is not the only one available, but  it adds weight to our
governance framework of analysis. An advantage of t his proposal lies
                                                
12  It  should  be  noted  that  such  agent  owes  fiduciary  duties  to  the  company’s
creditors. In other cases, like personal investments, or acquisition of fixed assets by
a company, the agent will be fiduciary of the investor or the company.
13 The first two questions are of paramount importance since answering them leads
to the role of a fiduciary agent, a topic that will be settled down in subsection 2.2. It
will be for subsection 1.3 to deal with the problem of underperformance.11
on  the  fact  that  keeps  the  standard  model  as  a  benchmark  and
furnishes practitioners with a simple course of action to redress likely
imbalances in the portfolio.
Basically,  it  comes  down  to  a  string  of  quasi-variable  cash  flows,
CF(k), that can be split down into two components:
(3)
CF ( k )    =   C  +  G( k )
where C stands for the constant amount of money we should allocate
at the beginning of each  period,  in  the  event  that capital  formation
would  be  tied  together  with  a  fixed  reinvestment  rate  I.  To  put  it
another way, C is the cash flow that would be determined if we used
the standard model
14.
On the other hand, G(t) measures up the variable amount of money
required to fill the gap between what the manager should have got if
reinvestment had been earning the rate I, that is
FV(0; k)
and the actual value of the portfolio
V P ( k )
that had been accruing along the period (k–1; k) out of the financial
assets held in the portfolio P till date k.
The message conveyed by (3) can be briefed as follows:
At  date  k,  the  company  or  the  investor  must  provide  the
manager with C dollars for the new period, (k; k+1), plus the
gap in value, G(k), to be added to the portfolio P at that date, in
case that the return of period (k – 1; k) would have been less
than the rate of interest I.
If  the  portfolio  had  outperformed  the  target  value,  then  G(k)
would have become a credit to the company or investor. Hence,
it carries a negative value in (3).
Therefore, we get hold of a hard-and-fast decision rule:
                                                
14 Background of this model was given in section 1.1, while a rigorous treatment can
be found in Appendices 1 and 2.12
￿ If  V  P ( k )   <   FV( 0; k )        Þ Þ Þ Þ      G( k )  >  0
then the company must deliver more than  C dollars to the fiduciary, at
date  k.
￿ If V  P ( k )   >   FV( 0; k )        Þ Þ Þ Þ      G( k )  <  0
then the company must deliver less than  C dollars to the fiduciary, at
date  k.
Remark:
Why should we stick to a  capital formation process  that yields a  constant  rate  of
interest  when  all  is  said  and  done,  while  a  portfol io  manager  could  attain  higher
returns following a more active strategy?
Compliance risk is the answer. The fiduciary agent  builds up  FV(0;N) dollars and he
shouldn’t seek for hazardous risk-return profiles
15, concerned lest he failed to comply
with  the  fiduciary  duties  of  loyalty,  diligence  and  disclosure,  as  we  are  going  to
highlight in section 2.2.
Being capital formation a step-by-step development, we have to keep
a record about how gap-fillers G(k) are threaded among them as we
shift from one period to the next one. And this will be the topic for
next subsection.
1.3 HOW TO SOLVE THE RESETTING ISSUE
The resetting issue calls forth two consequential commitments that are
by no means easy to disentangle:
a) it must submit an algorithm to work out the amount  of dollars
we need to fill the gap that stems from the portfol io value at the
end of each period;
b) it  lays  the  foundations  for  appointing  a  fiduciary  agent  to
manage the portfolio, so that transparency and acco untability could
be safeguarded.
                                                
15 The whole issue hinges upon better governance. We have coped with this matter
in  Tailoring  Compliance  Risk  and  the  Compliance  Function  for  Non-Financial
Organizations (Apreda, 2006, also in 2007d).13
Whereas  the  fiduciary  feature  will  be  expanded  on  further  in
subsection 2.2, this is the place where we are going to track down how
the portfolio should be retooled at the beginning of each period
16.
Therefore,  we  will  work  out  an  iterative  program  that  proceeds  by
stages,  each  of  them  consisting  of  rules  that  bring  about  certain
results  out  of  inputs  coming  along  from  earlier  stages.  The  format
requires the following entries
17:
- starting value;
- starting resetting value for the portfolio;
- final value, as expected by using the standard mode l;
- final value of the portfolio;
- assessing the gap in return;
- assessing the gap in value;
- final resetting value for the portfolio, which beco mes the
starting value to be used in next iteration.
Stage 1, ending at date t = 1
starting value:
(S1-1)
FV(0; 0)    =   C   =   V P ( 0 )
final value, expected for the end of this stage (t = 1):
(S1-2)
FV(0; 1)   =    FV(0; 0) . [1 + I ]
final value, realized at the end of this stage (t = 1):
(S1-3)
V P (1)   =   V P ( 0 ) . [1 + R(0; 1) ]
assessing the gap in return:
(S1-4)
[1 + I ]  =  [1 + R(0; 1)] . [1 + g(0; 1)] 
assessing the gap in value:
we plug (S1-1), (S1-3) and (S1-4) into (S1-2):
                                                
16 The iterative numerical program will be run through subsequent stages, leaving for
Appendix 3 the inductive proof of the algorithm.
17 At stage k we will need all of the entries; at stages 1 and 2 some of them can be
skipped.14
FV(0; 1)    =    FV(0; 0) . [1 + I ]
FV(0; 1)   =  V P ( 0 ) . [ 1 + R(0; 1)] . [1 + g(0; 1)]
which leads to
(S1-5)
FV(0;1)  =  V P ( 1 ) . [ 1  +  g(0; 1) ]
or, equivalently,
FV(0; 1)   =  V P ( 1 )  +  V P ( 1 ) . g(0; 1)
where
V P ( 1 ) . g(0; 1)
measures  the  gap  in  value  at  the  end  of  the  first  period.  In  other
words,
G(1)   =   V P ( 1 ) . g(0; 1)
the rate g(0; 1) being positive whenever the portfolio comes short of
its target, and negative otherwise.
Stage 2, ending at date t = 2
starting value: taking advantage of (S1-5)
       (S2-1)
FV(0; 1) + C   =  V P (1) . [1 + g(0; 1)] +  C
resetting value for the portfolio at the start of this stage:
(S2-2)
V * P (1)  =  V P (1) . [1 +  g(0; 1)] +  C
final value, expected for the end of this stage (t = 2):
(S2-3)
FV(0; 2) = < FV(0; 1) + C > . [1 + I ]
final value, realized at the end of this stage (t = 2):
(S2-4)
V P (2)  =  V * P (1) . [1 +  R(1; 2) ]
assessing the gap in return:
(S2-5)
[ 1  +  I ]  =  [ 1  +  R(1; 2) ] . [ 1  +  g(1; 2) ]15
assessing the gap in value:
by plugging  (S2-1), (S2-2), (S2-4) and (S2-5) into (S2-3), we get
FV(0; 2)   =   <  FV(0; 1)  + C  > .  [ 1  +  I ]
FV(0; 2)  =  V * P ( 1 )  .  [ 1  +  R(1; 2) ] . [ 1  +  g(1; 2) ]
which amounts to
(S2-6)
 FV(0; 2)  =  V P (2) . [1 +  g(1; 2)]
or, likewise,
FV(0; 2)   =  V P ( 2 )  +  V P ( 2 ) . g(1; 2)
and the gap in value finally becomes
G(2)   =   V P ( 2 ) . g(1; 2)
Stage k, ending at date t = k
Former  stages  have  uncovered  the  pattern  of  an  iterative  algorithm
whose  derivation  will  be  rendered  in  Appendix  3.  Hence,  for  any
arbitrary stage k the following relationships will hold:
starting value:
(S3-1)
FV(0; k – 1)  +  C  =
=   V P ( k – 1) . [ 1  +  g(k – 2; k – 1) ]  +  C
resetting value for the portfolio at the start of this stage:
(S3-2)
V * P ( k – 1)   =
=   V P ( k – 1) . [ 1  +  g(k – 2; k – 1) ]  +  C
final value, expected for the end of this stage (t = k):
(S3-3)
FV(0; k) = < FV(0; k – 1)  + C > . [1 + I ]
final value, realized at the end of this stage (t = k):
(S3-4)
V P ( k )   =   V * P ( k – 1) . [ 1  +  R(k – 1; k) ]16
assessing the gap in return:
(S3-5)
[ 1  +  I ]  =  [ 1  +  R(k – 1; k) ] . [ 1  +  g(k – 1; k) ]
assessing the gap in value:
by plugging (S3-1), (S3-2), (S3-4) and (S3-5) into (S3-3), we get
FV(0; k)   =   <  FV(0; k – 1)  + C  > . [ 1  +  I ]
and, subsequently
FV(0; k)   =
=   V * P ( k – 1) . [ 1  +  R(k – 1; k) ] . [ 1  +  g(k – 1; k) ]
hence:
(S3-6)
FV(0; k)   =   V P ( k ) . [ 1  +   g(k – 1; k) ]
or, likewise,
FV(0; k)   =  V P ( k )   +   V P ( k ) . g(k – 1; k)
and the gap in value becomes
(S3-7)
G(k)  =  V P ( k ) . g(k – 1; k)
final resetting value for the portfolio at the end of this stage (t = k):
(S3-8)
V * P ( k)   =   V P ( k ) . [ 1  +  g(k – 1; k) ]  +  C 
It goes without saying that the quasi-variable cash flow CF(k), already
defined in (3), can be worked out from (S3-7) and (S3-8):
CF( k )   =   V P ( k ) . g(k – 1; k)    +   C
2. THE PRAGMATICS OF SINKING FUNDS
Broadly speaking, by Pragmatics we are to understand the study of
decision-making  and  problem-solving  issues,  by  means  of  down-to-17
earth, empirical, learning-by-doing, and experimental approaches
18. All
over  this  paper,  the  expression  will  stand  for  the  practical  and
purposeful usage of sinking funds in business strategies
19.
With  a  view  to  illustrating  sinking  funds  in  actual  practice,  we  are
going to point up the following examples:
￿ from the side of a single investor, a sinking fund  becomes functional
in capital formation processes related to real esta te, an insurance
package,  a  retirement  plan  to  meet  old  age,  or  to  a ttend  future
education expenses for the family’s children;
￿ institutional investors (like pension funds and insurance companies)
currently use them as vehicles to planning for capital needs ahead
in the future;
￿ among  companies  in  the  private  sector,  sinking  fund s  come  in
handy for a variety of purposes, namely:
– replacement of standing capital assets as well as t he purchase of
new ones;
– the framing of investment decisions in the future
20;
                                                
18 Pragmatic actions, procedures, beliefs and knowledge, became the subject matter
of many contributions made along the history of ideas. Conspicuously, Pragmatism
stands out among them and can be regarded as the philosophical attempt to explain
epistemological issues, in particular the theory of knowledge and the methodology to
be  applied  in  scientific  research,  by  stressing  practical  grounds  and  avoiding
dogmatic standpoints. In the words of William James (1907):
The whole function of philosophy ought to be to find out what definite difference it
will make to you and to me, at definite instances in our life, if this world-formula or
that world-formula be the true one.
Pragmatism  as  a  philosophy  for  human  action  was  developed  by  a  group  of
distinguished  American  scholars,  among  which  we  find  Charles  Sanders  Pierce,
William  James,  John  Dewey,  and  the  famous  Judge  Oliver  Wendell  Holmes.
Background on their lives and work, as well as how they influenced American culture
can be tracked down in a highly remarkable book The Metaphysical Club, written by
Louis  Menard  (2001).  A  classical  rendering  of  this  philosophical  movement  is
Pragmatism, by William James (1907,1990).
19 In the field of Linguistics, the word “pragmatics” is widely used. It refers to how
we deal with words and expressions by attaching them distinctive meanings when we
interact with other people. On this account, see for example the Oxford Dictionary of
English Grammar, by Sylvia Chalker and Edmund Weiner (OUP, 1994, Oxford, UK).
20 As it would be with the engineering for real options or, by the way, the so-called
staging finance in venture capital endeavors.18
– the repayment of debt to bondholders and institutio nal investors;
– by the same token, the paying back of bank liabilit ies;
– redemption  of  financial  hybrids,  like  preferred  sto ck,  convertible
preferred  stock  with  an  in-built  maturity  feature
21,  bonds  with
Warrants, dual preferred stock and debt, convertibl e bonds;
– incentive packages to senior management and directo rs
22.
The pragmatic viewpoint that I am advocating in thi s paper intends to
handle  two  subject  matters  often  constrained  by  tra nsactional  and
regulatory environments:
 i. the choice of a mechanism for capital formation;
 ii. the fiduciary role performed by an appointed portfo lio manager.
2.1 THE CHOICE PROBLEM
Let us assume we are interested in designing a mech anism for paying
back the principal of a bond to be issued shortly.  Which would be the
most fitting alternatives at hand?
a) Firstly, we could float a bullet bond, which pays t he full amount
of principal at maturity date  N. For certain, it is a widespread
style  of  repayment  in  the  corporate  world.  However,   if  the
company  does  not  build  up  a  sinking  fund,  as  maturi ty
approaches it must find out how to meet the liabili ty, either by
issuing  new  securities  or  depleting  its  own  savings
23.  By  and
                                                
21  Standard  preferred  stock,  like  ordinary  shares,  does  not  convey  any  definite
maturity date; in point of fact, they have an indefinite span of life. In contrast, lately
designs for preferred stock endow them with maturity, for instance dual preferreds
(principal  redeemed  in  one  currency,  while  preferred  dividends  in  other)  or
convertible  preferred  (for  which  a  mandatory  maturity  date  is  essential  for  the
conversion  mechanism  to  end  up  outright).  More  on  this  issue  can  be  found  in
footnotes 3 and 5.
22 Background  on preferred  stock can be  found  in  Apreda  (2004)  that  focuses  on
one- and two-tiered  convertible preferred  stock with the purpose of meeting debt
restructuring,  the  enhancing  of  the  capital  structure,  as  well  as  the  design  of
compensation packages.
23  This  may  be  accomplished,  for  instance,  through  retained  earnings  (a  rather
debatable decision, by all means), or by selling financial assets that have been kept
in the company’s portfolio of financial investments (a much more pragmatic stance).19
large, as maturity date nears, risky strains may be put on the
company’s Treasury.
b) Another choice may consist in issuing a bond that m akes a string
of  consecutive  repayments  so  as  to  cancel  the  princ ipal
progressively along its life expectancy. By far, it  is a well-known
procedure, even used by governments  when  placing  so vereign
bonds in the market. Among its advantages, it can b e said that
allows the company’s Treasury to deal with the liab ility at a more
relaxing pace than in the case of bullets. On the o ther hand, the
downside  lies  on  the  fact  that  many  markets  as  well   as  a
variegated range of investment groups would rather  avoid them
on account of either taxes arising out of partial r epayments, or
diminishing interest payments.
c) There are also bonds that ultimately blend features  outlined in a)
and b).  For  the  sake  of  example,  let  us  assume  the  company
issues  a  bullet  with  an  in-built  contingency  by  whi ch  as  from
certain date, it keeps the right open to repurchase  the standing
bond  (the  oft-quoted  “call  provision”).  For  example,  the
company’s Treasury could find sensible to trade off high levels of
liquidity against declining levels of rates of interest. But such a
device could become a stumbling block for investors (or certain
market  preferred  habitats).  For  one  thing,  a  call  provision
prevents investors from collecting interest payments as from the
exercise  of  such  an  option.  For  another,  they  would  likely
request from the company a counterprovision so as to exercise
the  right  to  sell  the  security  back  to  the  issuer  (the  so-called
“put provision”).
d) Finally, we may also weigh up the choice of issuing  bonds with  a
a sinking fund. Needless to say that if any company  picked up
one of the financial vehicles reviewed above, then  the problem
would be settled outright, doing without any sinkin g fund.
The  four  paths  of  action  reviewed  above  stand  as  ex amples  that
illustrate, for all intents and purposes, what shou ld be meant under
the heading of “ the choice problem ”.
2.2 THE FIDUCIARY AGENT
Once  the  company  reaches  the  decision  in  favor  of  a   sinking  fund,
bondholders  and  banks  would  play  on  their  safest  si de  by  claiming20
greater latitude in monitoring how the company designs and handles
the vehicle along the planning horizon until maturity.
To  get  rid  of  pervading  weaknesses  lying  around  any  sinking  fund
internally  managed,  there  has  been  a  distinctive  shift  in  global
financial  markets  towards  appointing  an  external  fiduciary  agent  to
oversee the capital formation process
24.
As it was developed in section 2.1, our proposal hinges upon the fact
that the company will budget cash flows, according to relation (3)
CF ( k )    =   C  +  G( k )
to be disbursed at the beginning of each period, turning over them to
the manager, who will purchase financial assets and hold the ensuing
portfolio in trust till maturity.
The  fiduciary  agent  must  comply  with  distinctive  duties  and  tasks.
Besides, appointing such agent also entails costs that will be ultimately
paid by the company
25. Let us move on to each of them in turn.
￿ Duties
Currently, two essential duties are highlighted in  the framework of a
fiduciary  relationship:  care  and  loyalty .  However,  boundaries
between  these  duties  overlap  to  some  extent,  as  Eas terbrook  and
Fischel (1991) stressed when dealing with this topic in their influential
book,
“ultimately, though, there is no sharp line between the duty of care
and the duty of loyalty”.
The duty of care stems from the need of acting “as a prudent person
does in the management of his own affairs of equal gravity”
26, which
stands  for  diligence.  The  duty  of  loyalty  assumes  a  behavior  that
                                                
24 Lawrence Wilsey (1947), after doing an extensive research of preferred stock in
the United States markets, pointed up that many companies after the Second World
War gave up the management of their own sinking funds on behalf of a fiduciary
agent.
25 I acknowledge here a helpful remark raised by Professor Marcelo Villegas (Ucema),
who suggested me to factor in fiduciary costs in this section.
26 Easterbrook and Fischel, chapter 4, p. 103.21
pursues, facing any conflict of interest, the fulfillment of the interests
of principals instead of the fiduciary’s own agenda
27.
For the last decade some scholars and practitioners from the field of
Corporate Governance [Black (2001), for instance] have been laying
emphasis on the convenience of adding the duty of disclosure either
in open or closed companies, and we could not agree more with such
proposal.  This  duty  points  to  full  disclosure  of  information  and  it
borrows from the more constrained duty of candor, which is focused
on  the  disclosure  of  material  information
28.  In  the  case  of  open
companies, it stresses disclosure to shareholders before they vote, but
also requests Directors to diligently oversee self-dealing transactions.
￿ Tasks
The  fiduciary  agent  must  undertake  a  complex  set  of   activities  in
compliance with its duties. To name but a few:
a) Monitoring that the company actually submits contra ctual cash
flows, comprising those arising from the resetting  of the portfolio
value and interest payments owed to creditors.
b) At maturity date, the sinking fund will have brough t the principal
to  completion,  and  the  fiduciary  agent  must  pay  it  off  to
bondholders.
c) In case the company had pledged real assets as coll ateral, the
fiduciary agent must audit that no misappropriation  would have
taken place during the bond life.
d) Purchasing financial assets to build up the portfol io that he must
manage.
e) Periodically, to disclose information both relevant  and material to
the creditors’ interests.
                                                
27 In particular, conflicts arising from self-dealing transactions. As Professor Bernard
Black  (2001)  remarked,  “in  the  United  States,  the  duty  of  care  is  mostly  an
aspirational  statement  about  how  directors  should  try  to  act,  and  not  a  basis  for
liability if the directors fall short of this standard”.
28 Although “material” is a catchword, there is a meaning that has proved suitable for
corporate governance. Following the Black’s Law Dictionary, by material is currently
understood  something  of  such  nature  that  knowledge  of  the  item  would  affect  a
person’s decision-making process. It goes without saying that lack of consequential
information  may  bring  about  either  monetary  or  reputational  losses,  as  well  as
regulatory punishments.22
f) To perform as a broker of asymmetric information be tween the
company  and  its  bondholders,  so  as  to  safeguard  cre ditors’
rights against any abuse or misdeed
29.
￿ Costs
When any company sticks to a sinking fund being ext ernally managed,
it must bear the costs since creditors are not expe cted to foot the bill.
On  the  other  hand,  these  costs  are  to  be  traded  off   against  likely
rewards, either intangible or tangible ones:
- among  intangible benefits we can point to the reputational signal
that spreads over capital markets after announcing the preference for
a sinking-fund vehicle;
-  by  far,  the  most  relevant  tangible  benefit  lies  on  the  extent  to
which  the  coupon-rate  of  interest  decreases  in  relation  to  the  level
offered by a similar security without the sinking fund provision.
Whereas costs may be assessed as a matter of course, rewards are
rather elusive to deal with. Nevertheless, and taking a further step in
this  line  of  argument,  let  us  denote  the  estimated  rate  of  interest
offered by the financial when it is devoid of any sinking fund
R(no sinking fund)
while
R(sinking fund) ,   C(fiduciary agent) ,   D D D DR(credit-risk rating)
will stand for, respectively, the rate of interest offered when a sinking
fund is attached to the bond, the cost rate of appointing the fiduciary
agent, and the expected incremental jump of the credit-risk rating in
the aftermath of the bond placement into the market.
We can contrive a break-even point relationship to link all these rates,
working out which would be the greatest coupon rate
R(sinking fund)
for the bond to contest another one with no sinking fund. In point of
fact, the break-even rate stems from the following relationship:
                                                
29  The  use  of  corporate  governance  brokers  and  how  they  trade  in  asymmetric
information was developed for the first time in Apreda (2007c).23
(4)
[ [ [ [ 1 +  R(no sinking fund)  ] ] ] ]    =    [ [ [ [ 1 + R(sinking fund) ] ] ] ] .
 .  [ [ [ [ 1 +  C(fiduciary agent) ] ] ] ]  .  [ [ [ [ 1 +  D D D DR(credit-risk rating) ] ] ] ]
The  reader  should  bear  in  mind  that  credit  risk  rating  would  likely
improve  with  the  sinking  fund,  and  hence  there  should  follow  a
cutback in the risk measure, which leads  D D D DR(credit-risk rating) to
ultimately carry a negative sign.
Therefore, next inequality
(5)
[ [ [ [ 1 + R(no sinking fund) ] ] ] ]    >    [ [ [ [ 1 + R(sinking fund) ] ] ] ] .
 . [ [ [ [ 1 + C(fiduciary agent) ] ] ] ]  .  [ [ [ [ 1 + D D D DR(credit-risk rating) ] ] ] ]
becomes a sufficient condition to make the sinking fund fully tenable in
the end.
What (5) brings to light is the fact that a bond with sinking fund can
actually  pay  a  lower  interest  rate  than  another  bond  without  such
feature. The size of such rate involves a trade-off between transaction
costs and credit-risk ratings. The compounding of these three variables
(coupon  interest,  credit-risk  rating  and  transaction  costs)  should  be
less  than  the  size  of  the  coupon  rate  offered  by  the  bond  without
sinking fund.
It  goes  without  saying  that  relationship  (5)  is  one  among  other
suitable benchmarks to establish the convenience or not of adopting a
sinking  fund.  On  this  regard,  great  care  is  needed  in  gaining
knowledge of intangible features that contribute to the governance of
a company when this mechanism is set up, although their assessment
could be not  so  easily  tractable  like  credit  ratings.  Next  section  will
expand  on  how  it  is  possible  to  get  hold  of  intangibles  that  foster
governance.
3.  COVENANTS AND GOVERNANCE
How  could  we  actually  upgrade  the  company’s  governance  after
engaging a fiduciary agent? This may be mainly accomplished through
four courses of action:24
a) The company should embed a sinking-fund provision i n the Charter
of the organization or, still better, in the Govern ance Statute, as I
have  recently  set  forth  elsewhere
30.  It  must  be  a  sort  of  multi-
purpose  provision  that  comprises  capital  formation  processes
intended  for  equity,  debt  and  financial  hybrids  iss ues,  as  well  as
capital assets replacement.
b) The appointment of a fiduciary agent fosters not on ly accountability
but  compliance  as  well.  Firstly,  because  the  fiduci ary  holds  the
company accountable and abiding by the covenants at tached to the
sinking fund. Secondly, since investors can follow  up the extent to
which  both  the  company  and  the  fiduciary  agent  meet   their
contractual  duties.  Simultaneously,  transparency  wi ll  improve  as
long as the fiduciary is empowered to request from  the company
full disclosure of all information that could be co nsequential for the
interests of investors and banks.
c) Putting up capital with the help of a sinking fund  brings pressure at
least in three governance-related strands
31:
￿ owners  as  well  as  the  Board  of  Directors  remain  saf e  in  the
knowledge  that  managers  would  be  prevented  from  whe eling
and dealing with budgeted cash flows;
￿ the  sinking  fund,  when  managed  externally,  forestal ls  further
rent-seeking, soft budget constraint, and tunneling
32;
￿ by and large, the company is able to exhibit and ca rry out better
corporate practices towards creditors and stockhold ers.
d) If the sinking fund were employed in coping with  the replacement of
fixed assets, or with a new investment decision, th e fiduciary would
                                                
30  The  Governance  Statute  gathers  those  distinctive  principles  of  Corporate
Governance  that  bind  up  the  company  with  stakeholders  and  transactional
environments. More background on this issue in Apreda (2007a).
31 It’s worth bearing in mind that breach of debt covenants eventually triggers off a
default environment.
32  Tunneling  is  a  recently  coined  expression,  of  which  more  background  and
references can be found in Apreda (2007b). Broadly speaking, the expression stands
for  processes  and  activities  by  which  resources  and  property  rights  are  shifted
illegally, opportunistically and with guile, from one company to another in the same
group (or along different divisions in the same company). The transactions involved
take place by means  of financial or accounting “tunnels” that remain  out  of  sight
without being held accountable to other stakeholders and regulators.25
become a gatekeeper who oversees the whole process, giving rise to
stark upsides in governance, namely:
i. asset management within the company is sharpened up ;
ii. the  Board  of  Directors  stands  up  for  its  own  fiduci ary
duties  in  monitoring  what  happens  with  the  company’ s
assets in the quest of corporate value enhancement;
iii. when  depreciation  charges  are  managed  by  a  fiduciar y
fund, they do not contribute any longer to the comp any’s
self-financing
33.  This  outcome  has  two  overlapping
readings:
￿ self-financing is narrowed down to its natural sour ces,
that  is  to  say  retained  earnings  and  the  portfolio  of
financial  assets  looked  after  by  the  company’s
Treasury;
￿ sinking  funds  avoid  any  misuse  of  depreciation
charges under the guise of free-cash-flows, frequen tly
leading  to  wheeling  and  dealing,  empire-building,
perks-consumption, or tunneling.
3.1 DESIGNING A PROTOCOL FOR SINKING FUNDS
For  the  sake  of  illustration,  we  are  going  to  outli ne  a  protocol
34  by
listing ground rules to follow when a sinking fund  is attached to a bond
placement
35.
                                                
33  A  remark  is  due  here  on  account  of  the  depreciation  method  to  be  used.  The
standard model for capital formation requires a fixed depreciation charge
Dep (k) = C
at the beginning of each period. But, in contradistinction with the standard model of
capital formation, periodical allocations of Dep (k)  dollars would be preferred when
taking place at the end of each period. On the other hand, if Dep(k) ought to be
variable (and this is contingent upon the chosen depreciation schedule) an iterative
process like the one outlined in subsection 1.3 ought to be designed eventually.
34 “Protocol”, in this context, stands for a set of formal rules of behavior and basic
agreements  among  creditors,  the  company  and  the  fiduciary  agent.  Hence,  the
protocol must be regarded as a basic covenant that is actually attached to the bond’s
prospectus.
35 By the same token, a similar protocol could be drafted in the case of acquisition or
replacement of fixed assets, on the one hand, as well as issuing financial hybrids, on
the other.26
 i. The issuer of this bond pledges to creditors full c ompliance of all
and every commitment conveyed by the present covena nt.
 ii. The  issuer  of  this  bond  must  seek  for  an  independen t  and
reputable fiduciary agent who has to give certified  evidence of his
track record before being contracted out.
 iii. The fiduciary agent must employ cash flows delivere d to him from
the company to purchase financial assets, build up  and manage
the  ensuing  portfolio.  The  financial  assets  low-ris k  investments:
for  instance,  Treasury  Bonds,  Notes  and  Bills,  high ly  rated
corporate  zero-coupon  bonds,  or  liquid  substitutes  like  time
deposits in banks with the highest credit-risk qual ity.
 iv. The company has to meet a twofold schedule to turn  over cash
flows to the fiduciary:
a) payments of interest by their maturity dates;
b) cash-flows arising from the resetting of the portfo lio following
a transparent algorithm
36.
 v. At maturity date, the sinking fund will have brough t the principal
to  completion,  and  the  fiduciary  agent  must  pay  it  off  to
bondholders.
 vi. When issuing the bond, the prospect must disclose a ll relevant and
material information on behalf of creditors, either  related to the
bond itself, the sinking fund’s features, or the ro le of the fiduciary
agent.
 vii. A reliable and independent risk-rating company must  rate not only
the bond but also the fiduciary’s performance.
 viii. Being the fiduciary agent the caretaker of the sink ing fund, he has
to discharge four complementary tasks:
￿ to  hold  the  company  accountable  for  the  schedule  of
disbursements defined in item iv;
￿ to keep an updated record of each investor;
                                                
36 For instance, the sort of algorithm introduced in section 1.3.27
￿ to call for an annual meeting of bondholders’ repre sentatives;
￿ to request a fairness opinion from experts when any  decision or
future transaction might put in danger bondholders’  interests.
 ix. If  real  assets  had  been  pledged  as  collateral  for  t he  bond
placement,  it  is  a  duty  for  the  fiduciary  agent  to  survey  the
integrity and valuation changes of those assets so  as to protect
bondholders’  rights  over  them.  Covenants  upon  colla teral  also
refers to:
-  forestalling any decision that could lessen asse ts’ value;
-  rejecting  any  reorganization  process,  including  m ergers  and
acquisitions,  from  which  any  damage  to  bondholders  could
ensue;
- establishing  the conditions by which certain cov enants could
be  lifted  under  exceptional  circumstances  provided  that
bondholders agree to give their consent.
 x. The  company,  the  fiduciary  agent,  and  creditors  wil l  be  tied
together and held answerable by a multiple-agency c ontract that
might be contested in court by any of the counterpa rts. Breach of
covenants by the company will trigger off default e nvironments.
 xi. The company will pay the fiduciary both fees and ex penses arising
from the discharge of the agent’s duties and tasks,  inclusive of all
closely related transaction costs.
 xii. At  maturity  date,  after  paying  off  the  principal  an d  bringing  to
completion any adjustment needed for the settlement  of the final
balance,  the  fiduciary  fund  comes  to  an  end,  as  wel l  as  his
fiduciary relationship towards investors. However,  this action will
be contingent upon a positive  Statement of Compliance  issued
by an external and independent auditor.
CONCLUSIONS
It’s time to briefly put together the main contribu tions of this paper:28
a) We  have  giving  foundations  on  how  sinking  funds  may   be
successfully  devised  as  capital  formation  processes   within  the
framework of the portfolio management approach.
b) Whenever underperformance arises, the resetting of  the  portfolio
follows  next,  by  means  of  a  very  simple  algorithm  t hat  was
introduced in section 1.3.
c) By  endorsing  the  appointment  of  an  outside  fiduciar y  agent  to
manage the sinking- fund portfolio, we set forth a  solution to the
choice  problem,  as  well  expanded  on  ways  of  shaping   up  the
company’s governance.
d) Last of all, and to make a case for bond placements  with a sinking
fund  provision,  we  have  come  up  with  a  protocol  by  which
bondholders,  the  company,  and  the  fiduciary  agent  a vail
themselves of a sheltered covenant.
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APPENDIX 1
PROOF OF THE STANDARD MODEL
If we earmark cash flows of equal value C at the beginning of each
period, and they always earn the same rate of interest I period after
period, then at maturity date N the capital formation will amount to:30
(A1-1)
FV(0; N)     =     C . [ 1 + I ] 
N      +     C . [ 1 + I ] 
N – 1       +
+  C . [ 1 + I ] 
N – 2   +  ……… + 
 C . [ 1 + I ] 
2  +  C . [ 1 + I ] 
 1
now we divide (A1-1) by [ 1 + I ] to get
(A1-2)
FV(0; N)  / [ 1 + I ]    =
=  C . [ 1 + I ] 
N – 1   +  C . [ 1 + I ] 
N – 2   +
+  C . [ 1 + I ] 
N – 3  + ………  +  C . [ 1 + I ] 
1  +  C
substracting (A1-2) from (A1-1):
FV(0; N) - - - -  FV(0; N) / [ 1 + I ]   =  C . [ 1 + I ] 
N    - - - -  C
which leads us to
I . FV(0; N)  =  C . [ ( 1 + I ) 
N   - - - - 1 ] . [ 1 + I ]
To sum up, we have
37:
(A1-3)
FV(0; N)   =  [ C / I ] . [ ( 1 + I )
N  –  1 ] . [ 1 + I ]
APPENDIX 2
THE CUMULATIVE VALUE OF THE CAPITAL FORMATION
PROCESS
The relationship that solves the problem of the capital formation after
N periods is quite general. In fact, (A1-3) holds true for every N. To
sustain this statement, we need to provide an inductive proof.
Stage 1:  we have to prove that (A1-3) holds when N = 1.
                                                
37 By choosing a pattern of installments at the end of each period, we might have got
access to another well-known relationship
FV(0; N)   =  [ C / I ] . [ ( 1 + I )
N  –  1 ]31
FV(0; 1)   =   C . [ 1  +  I ]   =   [ C/ I ] . [  I  ]  . [ 1  +  I ]
FV(0; 1)   =   [ C/ I ] . [ ( 1 + I) 
1  –  1 ]  . [ 1  +  I ]
Stage 2: if we assume that (A1-3) holds true for N = k – 1, then we
must prove that also holds for N = k.
Therefore, let us imagine that at maturity date N = k – 1, the capital
formation amounts to
(A2-1)
FV(0; k – 1)  =  [ C / I ] . [ ( 1 + I )
 k – 1  – 1 ] . [ 1 + I ]
If we wanted to shift from this date to the following one, we should
add a new installment in (A2-1), so that a reinvestment will  ensue
outright:
FV(0; k )   =
=  {< [C / I ] . [( 1 + I ) 
k – 1 – 1 ] . [ 1 + I ] > + C } . [1 + I ]
which leads us to the following arrangement:
FV(0; k )   =
C . [ 1 + I ]  . { < [ ( 1 + I ) 
k   – ( 1 + I ) ] / I  >  +  1 }
and also to
FV(0; k )   =
C. [ 1 + I ]  .  < [ ( 1 + I )
 k   – ( 1 + I )  +  I  ] / I  >
or, equivalently,
FV(0; k )   =   C. [ 1 + I ]  . < [ ( 1 + I )
 k   –  1  ] / I  >
whence:
(A2-2)
FV(0; k )   =   [ C / I ]  .  [ ( 1 + I ) 
k   –  1 ] . [ 1 + I ]
Profitting  from  relationships  (A2-1)  and  (A2-2),  by  applying  the
Principle of Mathematical Induction, it follows that
FV(0; N)   =  [ C / I ] . [ ( 1 + I )
N – 1 ] . [ 1 + I ]32
holds true for every N.
Remark:
A formal, even elegant, statement of the Principle of Mathematical Induction runs
this way:
Let G be a subset of the set of natural numbers, N, that is to say:
G  Í Í Í Í  N
Assuming that
a) 1   Î   G
b) if  n  Î  G    Þ    n + 1  Î   G
then   G  =   N.
In actual practice, we usually want to prove that a n indexed property,  P(n), holds
true for every value of n. In other words,  G  comes defined as:
G   =  {   n  Î G   :  P(n)  holds true   }
Details, as well as alternative statements for the  Principle of Mathematical Induction,
can  be  found  in  a  highly  remarkable  book,  Proofs  and  Fundamentals ,  written  by
Professor Ethan Bloch (2000).
APPENDIX 3
ABOUT THE RESETTING MECHANISM
38
We want to show that, whatever the value of N, the resetting value for
the portfolio is given by the iterative process
(A3-1)
V* P (N)  =  V P ( N ) . [1 +  g(N – 1; N) ] +  C 
Stage 1:  we have to prove that (A3-1) holds when N = 1.
Indeed, we have already done it in stage 1, at section 1.3, when we
got (S1-5)
FV(0; 1)  =  V P ( 1 ) . [ 1  +  g(0; 1) ]
Next step consisted of setting up the starting valuation conveyed by
relationship (S2-1):
                                                
38  Bear  in  mind  that  most  among  subsequent  expressions  will  become  ex-ante
assessments and should be preceded by the expected value operator E[ . ]. It is for
the ease of notation that we are going to avoid using the operator, as a matter of
course.33
FV(0; 1)  +  C   =  V P (1) . [1 +  g(0; 1) ] +  C
from which the resetting value follows outright as
V * P (1)  =  V P (1) . [1 + g(0; 1) ]  +  C
Stage 2: if we assume that (A3-1) holds true for N = k – 1, then it
remains to show that also holds for N = k.
If we assume (A3-1) holds true for N = k – 1 this means that
V* P (k – 1)  =  V P (k – 1) . [1 + g(k – 2; k – 1)] + C 
The  final  outcome  of  the  development  at  the  section  referred  was,
precisely, that
FV(0; k)  =  V P (k) . [1 + g(k – 1; k) ]
and the only thing we must do is to think about the resetting amount
at such date, that must fulfills the equation:
FV(0; k) ] + C   =  VP (k) . [1 +  g(k – 1; k)] + C
from which it follows that the resetting value is given by
V* P (k)  =  VP (k) . [1 +  g(k – 1; k)] +  C
and by the Principle of Mathematical Induction, (S3-1) holds true for
any value of N.